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Abstract 
 
Geographical Indications (GIs) are considered as upmarket products because 
they are based on tradition and convey information about their geographical 
origin. Otherwise, the limitation of the geographical areas devoted to GIs and 
the exclusivity they benefit on the product lead to suspicions of monopoly 
power. Quality and market power should however reflect a stronger 
attachment, making consumers less price sensitive than for standard goods. 
This research aims to compare theses conjectures to empirical measures 
concerning the French cheese market. Price elasticities are computed from a 
demand model on 21 products, 11 Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) 
products and 10 non PDOs. The results are counterintuitive, PDOs being as 
price elastic as or more price elastic than standard products. This finding thus 
challenges the widespread idea that PDOs systematically correspond to high 
quality. It also has important implications in terms of competition policy, 
showing that PDO cheeses suppliers cannot decide on price increases without 
suffering large reductions in demand. 
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1. Introduction 
Protecting Geographical Indications (GIs) is one of the long-standing 
European public policies devoted to the modernization of the agro-food 
sector.
1
 GIs are public and collective brands allowing atomistic farmers to 
address the quality signalling issue (Akerlof, 1970). An important related 
objective is to keep a rural population in disadvantaged or isolated areas. Since 
1992, the national systems protecting GIs have been unified in a European 
measure extended to all agricultural products and foodstuffs, based on the 
Protected Designation of Origin (PDO).
2
 To be eligible to use a PDO, a 
product must provide arguments of a close tie to its ―terroir‖, a term which 
refers to a delimited geographical area where natural elements (climate, soil) 
are combined with human factors related to traditional know-how and recipes. 
In return for these requirements, the label assures the producers exclusivity on 
the product, prohibiting the use of its name by producers located outside the 
area, even if they comply with the requirements.  
 New World countries and European competition authorities have 
pointed out the risks of control supply and coordination between producers, 
resulting from delimited production areas and from the production exclusivity 
(Lucatelli, 2000; Babcok and Clemens, 2004; Evans and Blakeney, 2006). 
Quality and market power should however reflect a stronger attachment to 
GIs, making consumers less price sensitive than for standard goods. This 
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 Motorization, land and supply concentration through incentives to cooperatives along with 
quality improvement and quality signaling are the main policies implemented since the 1950’s 
to modernize European agricultures. 
2
 The French "Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée" which inspired the European PDO was 
established for the wine and spirits sector in 1935 and extended to cheese (1955) and then to 
all processed and unprocessed agro-food products (1990). Since 1993 and excluding wines 
and spirits which are the subject of another regulation (1493/1999), the EU possesses over 700 
registered GIs, designating over 150 cheeses, 160 meats and meat-based products, 150 fresh 
or processed fruits or vegetables and 80 types of olive oil (Evans and Blackney, 2006). In 
addition to the PDO, the European system includes the Protected Geographical Indication 
(PGI) which differs from the former in terms of intensity of the requirements. 
  
research aims to compare this conjecture to empirical measures concerning the 
French cheese market where the global PDO market share (17.3% in volume 
and 21% in value) is higher than in most sectors.
3
 Price elasticities are 
computed from a demand model distinguishing PDO cheeses from non PDO 
cheeses.  
 The paper is organized as follows. After an overview of previous 
studies related to GIs and to price elasticities in section 2, section 3 presents 
the data and the main characteristics of the cheese market. Section 4 
introduces the model. Section 5 sets out and discusses the results. Section 6 
concludes.     
  
2. Previous studies 
2.1 GIs: quality and welfare  
Most economic models have adopted the cartel assumption in a context of 
vertically differentiated products, PDOs being the high quality. The question is 
then whether supply restrictions can be welfare improving. Giraud-Héraud, 
Mathurin and Soler (2003) justify supply restrictions arguing that quantity and 
quality are negatively correlated. Crespi, Marette and Schiavina (1999) and 
Lence et al. (2007) consider pricing over marginal cost necessary to cover the 
fixed costs associated with the introduction of quality products on the market. 
Moschini, Menapace and Pick’s framework (2008) differs in that GIs are 
competitive organizations. According to these authors, in most cases, no 
scarcity factor constrains supply and anti-trust policies are efficient against 
anti-competitive practices. 
 Case studies are important to assess the stylized facts. In a study on 
three farmer-owned brands, Hayes, D. J., Lence, S. H. and Stoppa (2004) do 
not detect much antinomy with the anti-trust regulations. Examining two PDO 
French cheese cases, Colinet and al. (2006) confirm Moschini, Menapace and 
Pick’s assumption that the limitation of the area of production is rarely 
binding.  
 Quantitative papers are not directly related to GIs acceptability but they 
provide important insights. Bonnet and Simioni (2001) find that even if the 
two products were at the same price, consumers choosing a PDO Camembert 
cheese rather than the pasteurized version would remain in the minority. This 
finding questions the basic assumption of vertical differentiation between 
PDOs and non PDOs products. Studying the willingness to pay for renowned 
PDO Spanish veal, Loureiro and McCluskey (2000) show that the largest 
willingness to pay does not benefit the highest quality cuts but instead the 
intermediate quality. In the same vein, according to Hassan and Monier 
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 The only exception is the wine industry. However, a comparison of consumers 'attachment to 
PDOs versus standard products in the French wine sector is of little interest, the two product 
categories being hardly comparable. Indeed, non PDO wines refer to very low quality whereas 
intermediate and high quality wines are only PDOs. Otherwise, PDOs correspond to their 
―terroir‖ of origin (Bordeaux, Bourgogne...) while standard products are only branded 
products. 
  
(2006), the valorisation of the PDO attribute is higher when the label is 
associated with a store brand instead of being related to a reputed national 
brand. In the two situations, the PDO plays the role of quality assurance for 
standard products. More recently, Mérel (2009) established that the PDO 
organization of Comté cheese holds only very little market power.  
 
2.2 Price elasticities: a measure of consumers’ attachment to products   
Consumer’s attachment is a complex notion which translates into consumers’ 
sensitivity to price variations and can be captured through the price elasticities 
of demand: the lower the own-price elasticity (in absolute terms), the stronger 
the attachment to the good.
4
 
 Several economic models have explored the relationship between 
quality and price elasticity. In their pioneering paper, Mussa and Rosen (1978) 
find that a monopoly proposing two vertically differentiated qualities gets 
larger profits in absolute terms from the higher quality but lower in relative 
terms. Adopting a duopoly framework and assuming search costs on the high 
quality segment, Verboven (1999) finds larger profits both in absolute and 
relative terms for the high quality. Relying on a monopolistic competition 
model allowing for horizontal and vertical differentiation, Coibion, Einav and 
Hallak (2006) point out that most economic forces such as the scope for 
product differentiation and consumer’s price sensitivity are likely to induce 
lower equilibrium demand elasticities for higher quality products. 
 Many empirical analyses also find that quality lowers price elasticities. 
Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) and Pinkse and Slade (2004) refer to 
price sensitivities to explain that on the beer market, expensive premiums are 
less price elastic than common beers. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) find 
that upmarket cars have the lowest direct price elasticities and conjecture that 
consumers self select themselves on market segments according to their 
income.  
 Relying on large observations samples on several products categories, 
Tellis (1988), Dietche, Bayle-Tourloutou and Kremer (2000) and Bijmolt, 
Heerde and Pieters (2005) found that product category, brand concentration, 
advertising and price dispersion were important determinants of price 
elasticities. Using individual data, Hoch et al. (1995), Mulhern, Williams and 
Leone (1998) and Bertail and Caillavet (2007) highlighted the impact of 
demographic characteristics. Vilas-Boas and Winer (1999), Dhar, Chavas and 
Gould (2003) and Bijmolt, Heerde and Pieters (2005) demonstrate that 
controlling for the endogeneity of prices and revenue has a strong impact on 
elasticities, revealing consumers more price sensitive.   
                                                 
4
 Merunka, Changeur and Bourgeat (1999) pointed out that demand variations may occur not 
only in reaction to prices but also to non price shocks, for example a reduction in the shelf 
space devoted to the product by the retailer. However, this feature holds mainly for some 
specific outlets, in the short term.  
  
 Several papers have estimated complete food demand systems for the 
European countries, considering cheese as a single aggregate.
5
 Bouamra et al. 
disaggregated the French cheese sector into six product categories (soft, hard, 
semi-hard, blue, fresh and processed). In the present paper, we constructed a 
data base likely to distinguish between PDOs and non PDOs and to reflect part 
of the French cheese market diversity. 
 
3. The French cheese market: data and main features 
We used home scan data from the Kantar Company, providing information on 
cheese purchases made in France between 1998 and 2003 by a representative 
sample of consumers including more than 8,000 households. The database 
distinguishes 129 original cheese products and makes it possible to separate 
PDO from non-PDO cheeses. Such a large set of products is obviously not 
directly usable. The first reason is computational: a demand system on 129 
alternatives would lead to estimating more than 10,000 cross-price parameters. 
The second reason is that most products having tiny market shares, too few 
purchase data are available for them, even at the highest level of aggregation.  
 We selected the most famous cheeses (11 cheeses) such as Camembert, 
Roquefort or Brie, even if the market share is small. Other cheeses are 
aggregated (10 aggregates) with respect to the manufacturing process: current 
soft, soft pressed, other soft (i.e. soft cheeses "à croûte lavée"), hard, blue, 
goat, spread and fresh. We thus consider 21 products, 11 of them being PDOs 
and 10 non PDOs (see table 1).  
  
Table 1: Average market shares and prices for each of the 21 cheeses between 
1998 and 2003 
 Products 
 
Expenditure shares Price (€/kg) 
Volume 
(%) 
Value 
(%) 
Current Soft Cheeses (CSC) 
1.PDO Camembert (CSC) 
2.Non PDO Camembert (CSC) 
3.PDO Brie (CSC) 
4.Non PDO Brie (CSC) 
5.Other PDO CSC  
6.Other Non-PDO CSC 
 
1.3 
11.2 
0.8 
2.8 
0.3 
15.1 
1.3 
8.1 
0.9 
2.1 
0.4 
13.0 
 
7.6 
5.6 
8.8 
5.8 
8.9 
6.7 
Soft Pressed Cheeses (SPC) 
7.Cantal (PDO ) 
8.Other PDO SPC 
9.Other Non-PDO SPC 
1.5 
3.2 
14.6 
1.4 
3.8 
14.7 
7.5 
9.1 
7.8 
Hard Cheeses (HC) 
10. Emmental (Non PDO) 
11.Comté (PDO)  
12.Other PDO HC 
13.Other Non PDO HC 
11.3 
4.1 
1.1 
1.6 
9.3 
4.8 
1.6 
1.7 
 
6.4 
9.0 
11.1 
8.6 
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 Bouamra et al. (2008) provide a survey on studies concerning European countries. 
  
Blue Cheeses (BC) 
14.PDO BC 
15.Non PDO BC 
16.Roquefort (PDO) 
1.3 
2.2 
1.7 
1.3 
2.9 
3.2 
7.6 
10.1 
14.7 
Other Soft Cheeses (OSC) 
17.Munster (PDO) 
18.Other PDO OSC  
19.Other non-PDO OSC 
1.0 
1.0 
1.4 
1.0 
1.3 
1.9 
8.3 
9.7 
10.4 
20.Spread cheeses and fresh 
cheeses 
21.Goat cheeses 
16.3 
6.1 
17.2 
8.1 
8.2 
10.3 
PDO Cheeses 
Non PDO Cheeses 
17.3 
82.7 
21.0 
79.0 
9.3 
8.0 
(Source: Kantar WorldPanel Data) 
 
  PDOs are raw milk cheeses, which makes them tastier than non 
PDOs, based on pasteurized milk.
6
 Raw milk generates additional 
processing costs and may be associated in consumer’s mind with some 
health risk. Table 2 compares PDO and non PDO cheeses according to 
several characteristics: purchasing habits, scope for product differentiation, 
brands concentration, income and mean price. Table 3 is the matrix of 
correlations between all these variables plus the dummy PDO. 
  Purchasing habits are measured by the average number of 
purchasing acts per year during the 1998-2003 period. The extent of 
product differentiation is approached by the coefficient of variation of the 
price (CVP) which, for each product, reflects both the number of models 
and the market structure. This measure is consistent with a qualitative 
approach of product differentiation, obtained by quoting one (or zero) if 
some differentiation does exist (or not) for each product characteristic 
(packaging, tastes, weights…) and summing across the characteristics 
(correlation between the two indexes is 0.52, see table 3). Brand 
concentration is measured by the market share of the first four brands 
(CR4), each store brand being considered as a distinctive brand.
7
 Income is 
the mean revenue per family member (children are accounted according to 
their age) of all the households having purchased the good at least once 
over the period.  
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 Nowadays, the process is sometimes facilitated by replacing raw milk by ―thermisé‖ milk, in 
which milk is heated but less than for pasteurization, in order to keep part of the microbial 
flora alive.  
7
An alternative measure to the CR4, the Herfindhal index, provides equivalent results (the 
coefficient of correlation between the two indexes is 0.888). 
  
Table 2: Comparison between PDO and non-PDO products according 
 to several characteristics (standard deviations are given into brackets) 
Variables Total 
mean 
Mean for PDOs Mean for standard  
cheeses 
Nber of observations 
 
21 11 10 
Purchasing frequency 
(Nber of purchases) 
28757 
(7106) 
9550 
(1703) 
49885 
(11723) 
 
Coefficient of Variation of Price 
(CVP) 
 
Qualitative approach of 
differentiation (QAD) 
 
27.8 
(9.5) 
 
3.5 
(2.4) 
 
24.2 
(8.3) 
 
1.9 
(1.0) 
 
31.8 
(9.6) 
 
5.2 
(2.3) 
 
Brand concentration (CR4) 
    
   35.6 
(23.1) 
 
31.7 
(23.1) 
 
40.7 
(20.5) 
 
Purchasers monthly income per  
family member 
 
 
1058.7 
(194.3) 
 
1130.8 
(208.9) 
 
979.4 
(148.8) 
Mean price 
 
 
8.7 
(2.0) 
9.3 
(2.1) 
8.0 
(1.8) 
(Source: Kantar WorldPanel Data) 
 
 
 
Table 3: Matrix of correlations between product characteristics  
 PDO Purchases  CVP  QAD CR4 Income Price 
PDO    —       
Purchases 
CVP  
-0.634** 
-0.406* 
          — 
0.523** 
 
   — 
    
QAD 
CR4 
Income 
-0.696** 
-0.199 
 0.399* 
0.717** 
-0.173 
-0.151 
  0.521** 
 -0.385* 
-0.194 
    — 
-0.064 
-0.215 
 
    — 
0.254 
 
 
    — 
 
Mean Price  0.335 -0.330 -0.001 -0.159 0.239 0.169       — 
*Statistically significant at a * 0.10 level; ** 0.05 level; *** 0.01 level. 
 
 Compared to non PDO goods, PDOs are mainly niche: purchasing 
frequency, negatively correlated with the dummy PDO, is only 20% of that 
observed for standard cheeses. Product differentiation in the cheese sector 
diversifies presentations (weights, forms and packaging) and tastes and 
introduces new characteristics such as ―light‖ or ―organic‖. As they are 
required to be faithful to traditional recipes, PDOs are logically less involved 
in the process of innovation than non PDOs (the CVP is significantly lower for 
PDOs than for non PDOs). While PDOs can be unbranded goods processed by 
numerous small firms (for example in Comté), for several PDO cheeses 
(namely Roquefort or Camembert), brand concentration is very high: globally 
thus, the CR4 is not significantly different between the two products 
categories. Otherwise, in mass distribution, PDOs purchasers' mean income is 
significantly, but only slightly, higher than for standard products 
  
(1131€/month against 979€). Lastly, the mean price difference between the 
two products categories is not significant.
8
  
 
4. Method 
Price elasticities are computed using the parameters of an Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS, Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980). This model has been 
widely used in studies on food products, including complete demand systems 
and investigations on specific industries (see among many others, Nichèle and 
Robin, 1993; Shenggen, Wailes and Cramer, 1995; Moschini and Mielke, 
1989; Bertail and Caillavet, 2008).  
 AIDS preserves the generality of other flexible demand models 
(translog and the Rotterdam) since the AIDS standard share equation (at time t 
and for n products):  
ittPtYiitp
n
j
ijiitw  

  )/(loglog
1
                                             
can be read as a first-order approximation to the general unknown relation 
between product market share wit, prices itp  and income tY (deflated by price 
index tP ). Moreover, as it does not start from some arbitrary preference system 
but from a specific class of preferences (PIGLOG), it allows exact aggregation 
across consumers. This makes it possible to represent demands as if they were 
the outcome of decisions by a rational representative consumer.  
 One limitation of demand models is that they cannot include a high 
number of alternatives. This limitation can be overcome thanks to the weak 
separability assumption. For staple food products, this assumption is 
acceptable: consumers buy them without balancing them much against other 
goods. Lastly, in demand models consumers may buy variable quantities. This 
assumption is more suitable than the unitary demand of choice models, more 
adapted to durable goods. Choices occurring upstream in the utility tree are 
taken into account through unconditional price elasticities (see §5). In the 
present study, we adopt a four-stages budgeting system.
9
  
When estimating AIDS, three issues are of particular interest. First, 
most papers have followed Deaton and Muelbauer's suggestion to replace the 
translog index (log )logloglog0 jtit
n
j
ij
n
i
it
i
it pppP    by a 
linear approximation, the Stone index ( it
i
it pwP loglog  ). Since then, 
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Additional costs induced by the use of raw milk instead of pasteurized milk are not the only 
source of price dispersion among cheeses. For example, the category of milk (cow or goat) 
also influences the costs. 
9
 Consumers choose between non food and food, then between the different food items 
(including cheese), then again between grated cheese and natural cheese and finally within the 
set of 21 natural cheeses. 
  
several objections have been raised against this practice.
10
 The second issue is 
related to the semi-negativity of the Slutsky matrix which reflects concavity in 
prices of the expenditure function. The third issue concerns the endogeneity of 
expenditure and prices. Mass distribution is concentrated and enjoys some 
market power related to consumers' attachment to a small number of retailers 
located in their neighborhood. Prices may thus be adjusted to market shares 
variations (Dhar, Chavas and Gould, 2003). Expenditure is also potentially 
endogenous because income variations simultaneously impact the expenditure 
and the market shares.  
 We specify a model which takes into account the three points. We 
estimate the AIDS system with the non linear price index (translog), impose 
the concavity in prices through the Cholesky decomposition (Moschini, 1998, 
see appendix 1) and use the instrumental variables technique to deal with the 
problem of prices and expenditure endogeneity. The system of equations is 
thus both nonlinear in the variables and in the parameters. A Non Linear Three 
Stage Least Square estimation (N3SLS) is performed using SAS 9.2 (―proc 
model‖ command). Note that the 21st share equation is omitted in order to 
avoid singularity of the system.  
To deal with the endogeneity problem, we collected another set of variables, 
available on a monthly basis, which may be used as instruments, related to:  
• dairy sector: price of milk, price of Comte milk, milk production, 
industrial production index (IPI) of milk, price of soya oilcake... 
• global economy: GNP, wages in food industry (IAA), non durable 
IPI, production price index (PPI) of diesel, PPI of plastic packaging, 
household food expenditure (cheese excluded)... 
• supply: the Private Labels market share for each good 
• weather: average monthly temperature in France for the period 
At the last stage of the utility tree, the final set of instruments includes all the 
exogenous variables in the system and a set of 28 additional instruments (see 
table 10, in appendix 2). We first test the relevance of the instruments by 
checking their significance on the first-stage regression (for each equation). 
Then, we test the validity of the set of instruments computing a Sargan 
Overidentification Test. The null hypothesis of validity of the instruments is 
not rejected (p-value of 0.82). 
 To avoid the problems of too few purchases or even zero purchase for 
some cheese categories, the estimation is conducted for a representative 
consumer. Aggregation is performed on a monthly basis (4 weeks/month) 
leading to 78 observations. Moreover, for homogeneity reasons, the 
observation is limited to mass distribution stores (including the hard 
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 Eales and Unnevehr (1988) have pointed out that budget shares appear on both sides of 
regression equations, producing simultaneity problems. Moschini (1995) found the Stone 
index is not invariant to changes in the units of measurement of prices. According to Buse 
(1994), the Stone index introduces a measurement error because prices are never perfectly 
collinear. Lafrance (2004) demonstrates that the linear model respects Slutsky symmetry 
under highly restrictive conditions which decrease the interest of the model. 
  
discounters), which represent 93% of the cheese market. Specialized cheese 
retailers, where supply is biased in favor of PDOs and prices are significantly 
higher, are not accounted for. Households' heterogeneity (income, education) 
thus remains out of the scope of this study which focuses on consumers' mean 
attitude toward PDOs. Lastly, to control for changes in tastes, we introduce a 
monthly trend variable. 
 Monetary illusions are usually neutralized correcting income and prices 
by a price index of consumption goods. However, between 1998 and 2003, 
cheese prices have grown more rapidly than inflation, leading to increasing 
real cheese prices, thus correlated with the trend. To overcome this 
multicollinearity problem, we deflate all values by the mean price index of 
cheeses (National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies).  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Direct price sensitivity 
Table 4 presents the unconditional marshallian price-elasticities. 
Unconditional (or global) elasticities take into account all the previous 
budgeting decisions whereas conditional elasticities are related to one level of 
the multi-stage budgeting process. In the present case, conditional and 
unconditional elasticities are very similar. The reasons are basically that 
within the cheese subset, each product has a weak market share and, similarly, 
that the cheese market share within food expenditure and, further, the food 
market share within total expenditure are also small. For similar reasons 
marshallian and hicksian price-elasticities do not differ much. Indeed, the 
dispersion of the income elasticities (see below, section 5.3) is smoothed by 
the narrowness of market shares within the cheese subset: revenue-effects are 
thus negligible (formulas are given in appendix 4).  
 
  
  
Table 4: Marshallian unconditional own-price elasticities 
Products Own price elasticity 
1.PDO Camembert (CSC) 
2.Non PDO Camembert (CSC) 
3.PDO Brie (CSC) 
4.Non PDO Brie (CSC) 
5.Other PDO CSC  
6.Other Non-PDO CSC 
              -3.72* 
-2.43*** 
-2.91*** 
-3.87*** 
              -3.56 
              -0.88** 
7.Cantal (PDO )SPC 
8.Other PDO SPC 
9.Other non-PDO SPCs 
-2.22*** 
-3.46*** 
-3.53*** 
10. Emmental (Non PDO) 
11. Comté (PDO)  
12.Other PDO HC 
13.Other Non PDO HC 
-2.24*** 
-2.08*** 
-2.31** 
              -0.99* 
14.PDO BC 
15.Non PDO BC 
16. Roquefort (PDO) BC 
-2.28** 
              -2.10* 
-4.73*** 
17.Munster (PDO)OSC 
18.Other PDO OSC  
19.Other non-PDO OSC  
-2.24*** 
-3.24*** 
-2.06** 
20.Spread cheeses and fresh cheeses 
21.Goat cheeses 
-1.12*** 
              -1.35* 
***, ** and * indicate the significance of the estimated elasticity  
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 
 All the elasticities have the right sign and only one is not statistically 
significant (Other PDO Soft Cheese). Residual autocorrelation has been tested 
for each of the 20 equations of the system. The null assumption is not rejected 
in 19 cases out of 20 at a 5% significance level (Ljung Box test, see table 11 in 
appendix 3). The trend is statistically significant in 8 cases out 21 (see table 12 
in appendix 3). The βi and γij coefficients measuring the sensitivities of the 
market shares to income and price variations are given in appendix 3 (tables 
13 and 14). 
 With a mean price elasticity of -2.55 (median -2.29) computed over the 
20 statistically significant observations, cheeses appear globally elastic to 
price. This result, which contrasts with previous papers, may be related to 
relaxing the exogeneity assumption of prices and income.
11
 In our study, the 
exogeneity assumption would have underestimated the mean and median 
elasticities by respectively 66% and 94% (see table 4), an evaluation which is 
coherent with other observations. Thus, according to Dar, Chavas and Gould 
(2002), controlling for endogeneity in an AIDS increases the magnitude of the 
direct price elasticities by 90%. Villas-Boas and Winer (1999) record a 50% 
increase in own-price elasticities estimated using a choice model where prices 
are instrumented. Bijmolt, Heerde and Pieters (2005) in their meta-analysis 
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 Supposing prices and income exogenous to the market shares, Bouamra et al. (2008) find 
for six aggregates of French cheeses own-price elasticities ranging from -1.22 to -0.27. 
  
covering 1851 price elasticities find that the exogeneity assumption 
underestimates the elasticities by 50%.
12
 
 Other methodological choices also influence the own-price elasticities 
magnitude, but not so greatly. Table 5 compares the results (mean and median 
elasticities) of 5 models relying on different assumptions. Imposing the 
concavity of the expenditure function increases the elasticities magnitude by 
half a point (model 1 to model 2, table 5). Conversely, using the translog index 
(instead of the linear index) has no impact (model 2 to model 3). Introducing a 
trend variable decreases the apparent price sensitivity (model 4 to model 5). 
This finding is also in accordance with Bijmolt, Heerde and Pieters (2005) 
who highlight that in the long run, sales elasticities increase in magnitude by 
0.04 per year.
13
 Introducing a trend variable captures part of this long term 
movement.  
 
 
Table 5: Comparison of price elasticities according to 5 different 
methodological choices* 
Models Mean Median 
Model 1: Linear AIDS (LAIDS) basic model -1.26 -1.40 
Model 2: LAIDS basic model  +  concavity (Cholesky) -1.74 -1.60 
Model 3: AIDS model + Cholesky -1.74 -1.60 
Model 4: AIDS model + Cholesky + Instruments -2.89 -3.10 
Model 5: AIDS model + Cholesky + Instruments + trend -2.55 -2.29 
* Comparison takes into account the 21 elasticities of each model 
 
  While methodological choices have a strong impact on the level of the 
elasticities, they do not influence the ranking as much. Spearman coefficients 
of rank correlation between the elasticities related to the five models in table 5 
are presented in table 6. Most coefficients are high (over 60%); the main 
sources of divergence are the trend variable (model 5 versus model 4) and the 
instrumentation of income and prices (model 4 versus model 3). 
 
                                                 
12
 Endogeneity can a priori bias own-price elasticities in the two directions (up and down), 
depending on the sign of the price-error term correlation. Resuming arguments from different 
papers, Bijmolt and al. (2005) provide some understanding of this feature: ―If a manager 
decides to decrease price for situations in which some factor known to him/ her but unknown 
to the researcher causes a positive demand shock, the price elasticity magnitude gets inflated if 
price is assumed to be exogenous. On the other hand, if at a positive demand shock, a manager 
increases price (e.g., to reap profits), the price elasticity estimate is biased towards zero under 
the exogeneity assumption‖. 
13
 This feature is referred to a more intensive use of promotions instead of advertising which 
makes consumers more sensitive to price. 
  
Table 6: Spearman correlations between price elasticities 
 computed from 5 models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Model 1: LAIDS  —     
Model 2: LAIDS  +  Cholesky 0.9019 —    
Model 3: AIDS + Cholesky 0.9096 0.9987 —   
Model 4: Model 3 + Instruments 0.7690 0.8590 0.8692 —  
Model 5: Model 4 + trend 0.4824 0.6354 0.6414 0.7059   — 
 
 Our results do not confirm the widespread belief that PDOs benefit 
from greater loyalty among consumers. Comparing the mean own-price 
elasticity of the two product categories reveals that PDOs are in fact more 
price sensitive than standard products (resp. -2.95 and -2.06, the means 
difference being statistically significant at a confidence level of 10%). For 4 
products which are only non PDO cheeses, the own-price elasticity is around -
1. Nine products whose own-price elasticity is around -2 split up equally into 5 
PDOs and 4 non PDOs. The 7 remaining very price elastic cheeses (elasticity 
close to or lower than -3, one observation being lower than -4) are 5 PDOs and 
2 standards products. Table 7 summarizes the distribution. In table 8, the 21 
cheeses are sorted according to their price elasticity. 
 
Table 7: Distribution of the own-price elasticities 
 Total number 
of products 
PDOs Standard 
products 
Elasticities around -1 
(from -0.88 to -1.35) 
 
4 0 4 
Elasticities around -2 
(from -2.06 to -2.43) 
 
Elasticities around or lower than -3 
(from -2.91 to -4.47) 
9 
 
 
7                                                      
5 
 
 
5
4 
 
 
2
 
Total     
 
20 
 
10 
 
10 
 
   
  
Table 8: Sorted own-price elasticities of cheeses 
Products Own-price 
elasticity 
PDO 
 16. Roquefort (PDO) BC 
  4. Non PDO Brie (CSC) 
  1. PDO Camembert (CSC) 
  5. Other PDO CSC  
  9. Other non-PDO SPC 
  8. Other PDO SPC 
18.Other PDO OSC  
  3. PDO Brie (CSC) 
 
   2. Non PDO Camembert (CSC) 
14. PDO BC 
10. Emmental (Non PDO)HC 
17. Munster (PDO)OSC 
12. Other PDO HC 
  7. Cantal (PDO )SPC 
15. Non PDO BC 
11. Comté (PDO) HC 
19. Other Non-PDO OSC 
 
 21. Goat cheeses 
20. Spread cheeses and fresh cheeses 
13. Other non PDO HCs 
 6. Other non-PDO CSC 
-4.73*** 
-3.87*** 
            -3.72* 
            -3.56 
-3.53*** 
-3.46*** 
-3.24*** 
-2.91*** 
 
-2.43*** 
            -2.28** 
-2.24*** 
-2.24*** 
-2.31** 
-2.22*** 
            -2.10* 
-2.08*** 
            -2.06** 
 
           -1.35* 
           -1.12*** 
           -0.99* 
           -0.88** 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
***, ** and * indicate the significance of the estimated elasticity  
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 Several reasons may lie behind this counterintuitive result. In 
particular, consumers have now become more attracted to products that are 
mild, safe and easy to keep. This feature works against raw milk cheeses, 
which have been marginalized in the shopping baskets. Becoming more 
occasional, PDOs purchases became also more dependent on prices. 
Otherwise, consumers are generally sensitive to product innovations. The 
PDO status does not favor the innovation process and this increases the 
marginalization of PDO cheeses in terms of household’s loyalty. Moreover, 
product differentiation makes it more difficult for consumers to compare 
prices, which lowers the price elasticities. Little-differentiated goods like PDO 
cheeses should thus exhibit higher price elasticities. It should be noted that the 
four least elastic products (all non PDOs) are also those with the highest price 
variation coefficients.
14
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 Single regressions of price elasticities on purchase frequency or price coefficient of 
variation are statistically significant and positive: each variable lowers the price elasticity 
magnitude. However, multicollinearity (the two variables are correlated with each other and 
with the dummy PDO, itself correlated with the own-price elasticities) makes it impossible to 
disentangle the different effects. In other terms, our database is constructed to compare the 
own-price elasticities of two categories of products; to assess the determinants of the 
elasticities, larger samples of observations are required. 
  
5.2 Cross-price elasticities  
Only 66 out of the 420 cross-price elasticities (16%) are statistically 
significant (results are given in table 15, appendix 3).
15
 Moreover, half of them 
refer to complementarities, with consumers buying several products during the 
same purchasing act. So substitutability is not a strong feature, which indicates 
that on the French cheese market, products remain specific. When competition 
occurs between brands selling standardized goods, cross-price elasticities are 
more systematically significant (concerning the American cheese market, see 
Cotterill and Samson, 2002 and Arnade, Gopinath and Pick, 2007). All goods 
have however one or more strong substitutes which, surprisingly, are not 
related to any basic element such as the process or the name of the product 
(PDO Camembert /standard Camembert). This last feature underlines the fact 
that PDOs and non-PDOs are perceived as separate goods, even if they go by 
the same name.   
 
5.3 Sensitivity to income 
Unconditional income elasticities are homothetic transformations of 
conditional elasticities, the coefficient of proportionality being the product of 
the expenditure elasticities at the upper stages of the utility tree (formula are 
given in appendix 4). Here, this product is close to 1 (0.88): the income 
elasticities thus reflect the cheese expenditure elasticities.  
 14 out of 21 income elasticities (7 PDOs and 7 standard products) are 
statistically significant (table 9). Across these 14 values, the mean income 
elasticity is 1.67 and the median is 1.32: cheeses are thus globally income-
elastic. Moreover, PDOs are more sensitive to income and expenditure 
variations than standard products: 5 out of 7 elasticities related to PDOs are 
above the median against 2 out of 7 with standard products and the mean 
values corresponding to the two sub-groups are respectively 2.25 and 1.10 
(their difference is statistically significant at a confidence level of 10%, see 
table 9). PDOs purchases are thus more conditional than standard products 
both on prices and on income variations, confirming their status of secondary 
source of provision.  
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 For a six aggregates choice set, Bouamra et al. (2008) find 25% of significant cross-price 
elasticities. 
  
Table 9: Unconditional income elasticities  
Products Income elasticity 
1.PDO Camembert (CSC) 
2.Non PDO Camembert (CSC) 
3.PDO Brie (CSC) 
4. Non PDO Brie (CSC) 
5.Other PDO CSC  
6.Other Non-PDO CSC 
              0.74 
0.78*** 
              0.69 
1.07*** 
              1.89 
0.32*** 
7.Cantal (PDO )SPC 
8.Other PDO SPC 
9.Other non-PDO SPCs 
1.58*** 
3.08*** 
1.85*** 
10. Emmental (Non PDO) 
11. Comté (PDO)  
12.Other PDO HC 
13.Other Non PDO HC 
0.66*** 
0.91*** 
2.37*** 
              0.32 
14. PDO BC 
15. Non PDO BC 
16. Roquefort (PDO) BC 
              1.01** 
              0.80** 
1.58*** 
17. Munster (PDO)OSC 
18.Other PDO OSC  
19.Other Non-PDO OSC  
              0.70 
5.21*** 
2.22** 
20.Spread cheeses and fresh cheeses 
21.Goat cheeses 
-0.18 
0.06 
***, ** and * indicate the significance of the estimated elasticity at 
 the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
PDOs are considered as upmarket products because they are based on tradition 
and convey information about their geographical origin. Otherwise, the 
conditions of production, especially the existence of limited geographical 
areas, lead to suspicions of monopoly power. Quality and monopoly power 
should translate into higher own-price elasticities. The aim of this paper was to 
check for this. The cheese market is a good example for this kind of 
investigation because PDOs cheeses are numerous and have a globally 
significant market share. Relying on 21 products including eleven PDOs and 
ten standard products, this study provides, to our knowledge, the first 
systematic investigation on this matter. 
 The results are counterintuitive. PDOs are as price elastic as or more 
price elastic than stadard products. So, globally, consumers are not more but 
less loyal to PDOs than to standard products. Like Bonnet and Simioni (2001) 
but for a large sample of products, this paper challenges the widespread belief 
that, in the cheese sector and for most consumers, PDOs represents the high 
quality. This research also has political implications since it shows that PDO 
cheese suppliers cannot decide on price increases without suffering large 
reductions in demand. This finding should be considered by competition 
authorities. 
  
 We found little price substitutability between products. However, PDO 
and non PDO cheeses are branded goods and there is competition between 
these brands too. To capture substitutions more accurately, further research 
could introduce one more stage in the utility tree, allowing consumers to 
choose between brands proposing the same product. Otherwise, the aim of this 
study was not to highlight the determinants of the price elasticities and the 
probable role of consumers’ tastes, purchasing habits and product innovation 
must be confirmed by further investigation. Extending the model to brand 
competition may also provide more observations to assess the determinants of 
consumers' attitude towards GIs. 
  
 
 
  
 Appendix 1: The estimated system 
 
We follow Moschini (1998) to deal with the concavity property in our demand 
system. To satisfy the concavity property, the matrix θ = [θij] must be negative 
semi-definite. One way to impose it is to reparameterize θ with the Cholesky 
decomposition. Then, a necessary and sufficient condition for the matrix θ to 
be negative semi-definite, is that it can be written as θ = –T’T where T=[τij] is 
an (n-1)*(n-1) upper triangular matrix (in other words: τij=0 for i>j). Example 
if N=5, T is 4*4: 
 
 
 
The locally concave system can be written as: 
 
 
To avoid estimation problems (due to too many parameters), Moschini (1998) 
suggests estimating a restricted model by taking a substitution matrix of rank 
K<(n-1)
16
. Moreover, adding a monthly trend variable consists in replacing αi 
by a αi’ = αi +mi . 
Thus, the system becomes: 
                                                 
16
 Moschini suggests that K does not exceed the number of negative eigenvalues of the 
unrestricted model. In our case, we have K=13. 
  
 
 
Once we have the estimated coefficients τij, we can first recover the θij and 
then recover the γij using the substitution term of the Slutsky matrix:  
θij= γij + αi αj - δij αi  with δij=1 for i=j and 0 for i≠j. Finally, we can easily 
compute the standard elasticities (see formula in appendix 4).  
  
Appendix 2: Instrumental variables at the last stage of the 
budgeting system 
 
    
Table 10: Instruments used at the last stage of the utility tree 
Instruments Source 
Standard milk price National Institute of Statistics and Economic 
Studies 
Price index of diesel id 
Price index of  plastic packaging  id 
Price of soybean cakes id 
Comté cheese wholesale price  id 
Wage in the food industry id 
Price index of dairy products id 
Price index of non durable goods id 
  
Produced Quantity of processed oak milk  Ministry of Agriculture (Agreste) 
Quantity of conditioned sterilized milk id 
Quantity of flavored  milk  id 
Food expenditure (cheese excluded) Kantar Worldpanel 
  
% Private labels (PDO soft cheeses) id 
% Private labels (standard soft pressed 
cheeses) 
id 
% Private labels (PDO soft cheeses "à 
croûte lavée")  
id 
% Private labels (standard soft cheeses "à 
croûte lavée" ) 
id 
% Private labels (Reblochon and other 
similar PDOs) 
id 
% Private labels (PDO blue cheeses) id 
% Private labels (PDO Brie) id 
% Private labels (Pasteurized 
Camembert) 
id 
% Private labels (Cantal) id 
% Private labels (Comté) id 
% Private labels (Emmental) id 
% Private labels (Munster) id 
% Private labels (Other standard hard 
cheeses) 
id 
% Private labels (Roquefort) id 
% Private labels (Spread cheeses and 
"fromages frais") 
id 
  
Average temperature in France INRA (Agroclim) 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 3: Some estimation results of the last stage of the 
budgeting system 
 
Table 11: Ljung Box test for residual autocorrelation 
(for each of the 20 equations of the estimated demand system) 
 
Equation  P-value 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
 10 
 11 
 12 
 13 
 14 
 15 
 16 
 17 
 18 
 19 
 20 
0.1438729 
0.0705631 
0.2352641 
0.9937290 
0.9392385 
0.0343230 
0.8677286 
0.7137678 
0.7630428 
0.2004335 
0.6734862 
0.6126476 
0.7584857 
0.1274372 
0.0699778 
0.1428842 
0.1498244 
0.3453170 
0.0861219 
0.0960614 
The null hypothesis corresponds  
to no autocorrelation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Sign of the trend coefficients (only when significant) 
 
  
m3 - 
m6 - 
m9 
+
 
m10 - 
m13 - 
m18 + 
m19 - 
m20 + 
m21 + 
  
                                   Table 13: Estimated βi for each of the ith estimated equation 
                                                  of the last stage of the budgeting system 
 
β1 -0.002 
β2 -0.009 
β3 -0.002 
β4  0.004 
β5  0.004 
β6 -0.083
***
 
β7 0.011
*
 
β8    0.094
***
 
β9    0.159
***
 
β10          -0.023 
β11 0.001 
β12   0.026
**
 
β13          -0.011 
β14 0.002 
β15 -0.003 
β16    0.025
**
 
β17 -0.002 
β18     0.063
***
 
β19     0.029
***
 
β20     -0.207
***
 
                                                                                                          *
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
 
 
  
Table 14: Matrix of the estimated γij coefficient of each of the i
th 
estimated equation of the last stage of the budgeting system 
 
 j 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
i 
1 
-
.035 -.035 .001 .004 .002 -.004 -.02* -.028 .009 .058 -.024 .011 -.013 .01 .019 .005 .007 .009 0 .029 
-
.007 
2 . -.12* .036** -.042 .003 -.039 -.021 -.049 .095** .058 -.009 .033 -.012 -.017 .045 .082** .001 .046* .012 -.08** .014 
3 . . -.016** .014* -.004 .018 .001 .003 .02 .013 -.001 -.015** .002 .005 -.028** -.047*** -.002 -.015* -.013 .017 .012 
4 . . . -.06*** 0 .012 .011 .012 .028 -.055* .011 -.002 .003 -.018 .024 .032 -.007 .016 .014 -.015 .016 
5 . . . . -.009 -.005 .001 -.002 .018 .02 -.003 -.007 .005 -.011 .002 -.007 -.002 -.007 -.008 .004 .009 
6 . . . . . 0 -.019 -.021 -.014 .038 .001 .016 -.012 .007 .034 .053 -.018 -.002 -.012 .013 
-
.046 
7 . . . . . . -.017 -.024 .013 .04* .016 -.005 0 .008 .012 .006 -.002 -.004 -.001 -.006 .011 
8 . . . . . . . -.089* .065** .087* .005 .003 -.017 .023 .019 .019 .01 .001 -.012 -.007 .002 
9 . . . . . . . . -.359*** -.054 .032 .054** -.004 .004 -.012 .036 -.024** .02 .049** .027 
-
.003 
10 . . . . . . . . . -.122 .008 -.014 .002 -.008 -.022 -.009 .003 -.012 .035 -.053 
-
.013 
11 . . . . . . . . . . -.053 .018 -.004 -.016 .017 .015 -.001 .001 -.011 .021 
-
.024 
12 . . . . . . . . . . . -.02 .013 -.001 -.012 -.029* .005 -.015 -.012 -.026 .005 
13 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 .013* 0 -.006 .007 -.003 .007 .023 
-
.004 
14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.017 .012 .016 -.007 .001 -.006 -.022 .021 
15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.032 -.077** 0 -.012 .003 .004 .005 
16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.118*** .006 -.04** -.013 .063** .012 
17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.013** -.002 .007 .019* .014 
18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.027* -.006 .027 .023 
19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.02 .005 
-
.019 
20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.049 .007 
21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note that to make the matrix easily readable, we do not write all the γij coefficients (for i>j and γ21,21). They can be easily recovered taking into account the homogeneity and symmetry 
restrictions (      =     =0 and γij = γji). 
  
 
Table 15: Matrix of the estimated unconditional and uncompensated price elasticities between goods of the last stage of the budgeting 
system (taking into account the whole utility tree)  
 
          j            
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
 
1 -3.715* -2.618 .116 .313 .148 -.163 -1.542* -2.127 .757 4.516 -1.79 .876 -.986 .818 1.46 .382 .521 .712 .04 2.404 -.443 
 
2 -.421  -2.432*** 0.447** -.511 .037 -.368 -.257 -.618 1.222*** .789 -.086 .415 -.139 -.205 .576 1.033** .021 0.562* .149 -0.810* .251 
 
3 .175 4.220** -2.913*** 1.703* -.448 2.165 .112 .308 2.43 1.543 -.068 -1.766** .264 .583 -3.260** -5.491*** -.225 -1.719* -1.532 2.171 1.447 
 
4 .195 -1.98 0.700* -3.871*** -.002 .699 .528 .569 1.367* -2.586* .575 -.115 .168 -.857 1.188 1.549 -.324 .737 .693 -.554 .856 
 
5 .539 .842 -1.081 -.009 -3.562 -1.301 .231 -.553 4.907 5.76 -.831 -1.898 1.331 -3.05 .616 -1.958 -.574 -1.97 -2.189 1.247 2.679 
 
6 -.016 -.227 .142 .112 -.035 -0.877** -.133 -.144 -.005 .372 .046 .136 -.076 .068 .283 .43 -.132 -.01 -.078 .279 -.273 
 
7 -1.390* -1.443 .067 .765 .057 -1.208 -2.217*** -1.695 .819 2.815* 1.151 -.393 -.011 .587 .862 .406 -.129 -.327 -.052 -.196 .845 
 
8 -.724 -1.31 .069 .31 -.051 -.496 -.64 -3.459*** 1.434* 2.280* .117 .043 -.433 .591 .491 .462 .273 -.072 -.37 .021 .12 
 
9 .066 0.668*** .141 0.193* .118 -.007 .08 0.371* -3.531*** -.328 .228 0.349** -.012 .028 -.074 .231 -0.160** .091 0.311** .376 .054 
 
10 .633 .689 .143 -0.582* .221 .523 0.438* 0.941* -.521 -2.245*** .124 -.152 .039 -.078 -.215 -.084 .044 -.138 .384 -.394 -.06 
i 
11 -.485 -.146 -.012 .25 -.062 .126 .346 .094 .706 .239 -2.076*** .368 -.064 -.32 .368 .318 -.013 .001 -.238 .623 -.42 
 
12 .722 2.125 -0.960** -.152 -.428 1.126 -.359 .104 3.272** -.895 1.118 -2.314** .84 -.044 -.788 -1.864* .333 -1.019 -.794 -1.431 .375 
 
13 -.731 -.641 .129 .2 .27 -.568 -.009 -.943 -.096 .209 -.175 .756 -0.991* 0.764* .003 -.299 .416 -.169 .39 1.484 -.143 
 
14 .803 -1.252 .377 -1.351 -.819 .668 .639 1.707 .315 -.545 -1.158 -.052 1.012* -2.281** .96 1.186 -.491 .049 -.421 -1.487 1.7 
 
15 .657 1.616 -0.968** .859 .076 1.282 .431 .651 -.375 -.691 .61 -.431 .002 .44 -2.099* -2.648** -.002 -.422 .109 .305 .249 
 
16 .157 2.637** -1.486*** 1.02 -.22 1.771 .185 .558 1.078 -.246 .481 -0.928* -.166 .496 -2.413** -4.734*** .194 -1.290** -.418 2.186** .452 
 
17 .65 .164 -.185 -.65 -.196 -1.663 -.179 1.005 -2.275** .393 -.06 .506 .701 -.625 -.004 .59 -2.242*** -.244 .647 1.980* 1.383 
 
18 .712 3.498* -1.135* 1.183 -.539 -.103 -.364 -.214 1.03 -.992 .002 -1.239 -.229 .049 -.939 -3.148** -.196 -3.241*** -.537 2.317 1.812 
 
19 .027 .62 -.675 .743 -.4 -.524 -.039 -.726 2.365** 1.828 -.586 -.644 .351 -.287 .161 -.681 .346 -.358 -2.064** .476 -.902 
 
20 .182 -0.380* .108 -.067 .026 .212 -.016 .006 .326 -.211 .174 -.131 .151 -.114 .051 0.403** 0.120* .176 .054 -1.115*** .124 
 
21 -.071 .25 .152 .219 .117 -.437 .15 .057 .101 -.068 -.247 .073 -.031 .277 .088 .176 .177 .29 -.215 .262 -1.349* 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
Appendix 4. Formula of conditional and unconditional Marshallian 
(uncompensated) elasticities 
 
 
Denoting by i and j two commodities belonging to the group of commodities r, 
following Green and Alston (1990) and Alston et al. (1994) the conditional 
elasticities are defined as: 
 
 price elasticity for good i with respect to good j:  
           
   
   
       
  
   
          , 
 expenditure elasticity for good i:          
  
  
    , 
where      is the Kronecker delta,       
          
          
  . 
 
To compute unconditional elasticities we use the method suggested by 
Carpentier and Guyomard (2001) that corrects Edgerton (1997). Carpentier 
and Guyomard (2001) provide the expression of price elasticities for a two-
stage budgeting, Bouamra and al. (2008) extend the formula up to a four 
stages case. 
 
For a four-stage budgeting, denoting by i and j two commodities, belonging, 
respectively, to the sub-groups of commodities r and s that belong, 
respectively, to the sub-groups a and b, belonging, respectively, to the groups 
φ and χ17, unconditional price elasticities at the 4th stage are defined as :  
 
 
where: 
  
                                                 
17
 Note that, in our case of interest, φ = χ = food ; a = b = cheese ; r = s = 
natural cheese ; and i and j belong to the 21 cheese products categories. 
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 Conditionnal price elasticities are given by :  
ijrae ))()((  is the conditional price elasticity of good i with respect to 
good j, 
))(( sre  is the conditional price elasticity of sub-group r with respect to 
sub-group s, 
))(( bae is the price elasticity of sub-group a w.r.t. sub-group b, 
))(( e  is the price elasticity of group φ w.r.t. group χ. 
 Conditionnal expenditure elasticities are given by :  
jsbE ))()((  is the conditional expenditure elasticity of good j (conditional 
w.r.t. expenditures of sub-group s), 
iraE ))()(( is the conditional expenditure elasticity of good i (conditional 
w.r.t. expenditures of sub-group r),  
sbE ))(( is the conditional expenditure elasticity of sub-group s 
(conditional w.r.t. expenditures of sub-group b), 
raE ))(( is the conditional expenditure elasticity of sub-group r 
(conditional w.r.t. expenditures of sub-group a), 
aE )(  is the expenditure elasticity of sub-group a (conditional w.r.t. 
expenditures of group φ), 
bE )(  is the expenditure elasticity of sub-group b (conditional w.r.t. 
expenditures of group χ), 
E  is the expenditure elasticity of group φ. 
 Budget shares are given by :  
jsbw ))()(( is the budget share of good j in commodity sub-group s, 
sbw ))(( is the budget share of sub-group s in sub-group b, 
bw )(  is the budget share of sub-group b in group χ, 
w  is the budget share of group χ. 
 δφχ , δab , and δrs are Kronecker deltas. 
 
For the same stage, the unconditional expenditure elasticity for good i that 
belongs to the sub-group r, belonging to the sub-group a, that belongs to group 
φ, is given by                                             where  
 
            is the conditional expenditure elasticity of good i (conditional w.r.t. 
expenditures of sub-group r), 
              is the conditional expenditure elasticity of sub-group r (conditional 
w.r.t. expenditures of sub-group a), 
  
         is the conditional expenditure elasticity of sub-group a (conditional 
w.r.t. expenditures of group φ), 
and        is the expenditure elasticity of group φ. 
 
 
Finally, in order to estimate the standard errors of all the estimated elasticities, 
we use the delta-method. 
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